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Positive mood states are believed to broaden the focus of attention in younger adults, but it
is unclear whether the same is true for older adults. Here we examined one consequence
of broader attention that has been shown in young adults: that memory for distraction
is greater for those in a positive mood. In the current study, positive and neutral moods
were induced in older adults (M =67.9) prior to a 1-back task in which participants were
instructed to attend to relevant pictures and ignore distracting words. Following a 10-min
filled interval, participants performed a word fragment completion task that tested implicit
memory for the distracting words from the 1-back task. Older adults in the positive mood
group showed greater implicit memory for previous distraction compared to those in the
neutral mood group. These findings suggest that affect influences the ability to regulate
attention in a similar manner for younger and older adults.
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INTRODUCTION
Affective states are believed to serve a variety of functions including
regulating the bandwidth of attention. Relative to negative states,
positive affective states broaden both spatial (Schmitz et al., 2009)
and temporal attention (Vermeulen, 2010), possibly because pos-
itive affect is a signal of relative safety to explore the environment
(Fredrickson, 1998; Friedman and Förster, 2010).
However, attentional broadening can also have negative effects
on cognition which can manifest in a number of ways, includ-
ing increased susceptibility to distraction. For example, posi-
tive affect can increase interference from distractors during both
flanker (Rowe et al., 2007) and set switching tasks (Dreisbach and
Goschke, 2004) relative to neutral or negative affect. As well, pos-
itive affect decreases performance on tasks requiring inhibitory
control, such as directed forgetting (Bäuml and Kuhbandner,
2009) and negative affective priming (Goeleven et al., 2007).
Therefore, it seems plausible that positive affect may impair the
ability to ignore irrelevant distraction by slackening inhibitory
control.
Given the apparently increased attention paid to distractors as
a result of positive mood, it is also possible that positive affect
can actually enhance performance should previously irrelevant
items later become relevant. Previous research demonstrated that
younger adults in both naturally occurring (Biss et al., 2010) and
experimentally induced positive moods (Biss and Hasher, 2011)
showed greater implicit use of previous distraction compared to
those in more neutral moods. Older adults, a population consid-
ered to have reduced inhibitory control abilities relative to younger
adults (Hasher et al., 1999), also show greater implicit memory for
distraction (Rowe et al., 2006).
An open question is whether the tendency for positive affect
to broaden attention and increase the implicit use of distraction
also extends to older adults who generally show less control
over attention than their younger counterparts (Rowe et al.,
2006).
In the current study, we tested whether mood influences older
adults’ ability to ignore distraction in the same manner as we have
demonstrated in younger adults. We used a paradigm that has
previously been used to demonstrate mood differences in implicit
memory for distraction among younger adults (Biss and Hasher,
2011) as well as age differences in priming for distraction (Rowe
et al., 2006). Positive and neutral affect were induced in older
adults prior to a 1-back task in which participants responded to
relevant pictures and were instructed to ignore superimposed irrel-
evant words. Following a 10-min filled delay, we tested implicit
knowledge of the previously distracting words using a fragment
completion task. If positive affect increases susceptibility to dis-
traction in older adults as it appears to in younger adults, then older
adults in an induced positive affect group should show enhanced
priming for previous distraction compared to those in a neutral
affect group.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty older adult participants (M = 67.9, SD= 4.6) were recruited
from the community and paid for their participation. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to either the positive (n= 30) or
neutral (n= 30) mood induction condition. All participants were
free of neurological or psychiatric illness, and were native Eng-
lish speakers or had learned English by age 6. In keeping with
the goal of assessing implicit memory for distraction, we replaced
data from participants who reported being aware of the connec-
tion between the 1-back and fragment completion tasks (three
in the neutral condition). In addition, we replaced participants
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who appeared to focus directly on the distraction, either by being
very slow (more than 2.5 SDs slower than the group mean; one
participant in the positive condition) or very inaccurate on the
1-back task (50% accuracy or below; three each in the positive
and neutral conditions) relative to the majority of participants
tested here and in prior work (Rowe et al., 2006; Biss and Hasher,
2011). The remaining participants had an average of 17.1 years of
education (SD= 4.4), and scored 35.3 (SD= 3.5) on the Shipley
(1946) vocabulary test. Mood groups did not differ based on age,
education, or vocabulary scores, t s< 1. The experimental pro-
cedures were approved by the Social Sciences, Humanities, and
Education Research Ethics Board at the University of Toronto, and
informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to the
experiment.
MATERIALS
Mood induction
One hundred forty-six pictures were selected from the Interna-
tional Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008) based
on the norms provided in the IAPS database. Pictures selected
for the neutral condition had valence ratings between 4.5 and
5.5 (M = 5.1, SD= 0.3), while pictures selected for the positive
affect induction had valence ratings of seven or higher (M = 7.5,
SD= 0.3). Arousal ratings did not differ between neutral (M = 4.1,
SD= 0.9) and positive pictures (M = 4.2, SD= 0.5), t (144)< 1.
Although these IAPS norms include ratings from younger adults
only, other normative data suggests that older adults’ valence
ratings of IAPS pictures are strongly associated with normative
ratings collected in younger adults (Grühn and Scheibe, 2008).
Sound clips free of verbal material were also selected for use in
the mood induction. In the neutral affect condition, a sound clip
with ambient street sounds was played. In the positive affect con-
dition, participants heard a jazzy version of Bach’s Brandenberg
Concerto No. 3 that has previously been used to induce positive
mood in young adults (e.g., Rowe et al., 2007; Biss and Hasher,
2011).
Mood ratings
Participants rated the pleasantness of their moods on a nine-point
scale adapted from Rowe et al. (2007), ranging from 1 (not at all
pleasant ) to 9 (extremely pleasant ). They also rated arousal on a
nine-point scale that ranged from 1 (very calm) to 9 (very aroused).
1-back task pictures
Fifty-five nameable line drawings were selected from Snodgrass
and Vanderwart (1980) and colored red. Fifty of these pictures
were superimposed with distraction: 30 with non-words, 10 with
critical primed words, and 10 with filler words, which were used
to reduce awareness of the connection between tasks.
Word stimuli and fragments
Two lists of 10 words and their corresponding fragments were
chosen, and were matched for the number of letters in both
the provided fragment and critical solution word, as well as
based on previously collected baseline completion rates (Ikier,
2005). Lists were counterbalanced such that each participant was
exposed to one list as critical primed words in the 1-back task,
and solved fragments from both lists in the fragment completion
task. Completion from the control list not seen in the 1-back task
was used to calculate baseline completion for critical words. The
critical words were between five and eight letters long (M = 6.0,
SD= 1.1), and fragments contained between two and five letters
(M = 3.4, SD= 0.8). All fragments had multiple solutions (e.g.,
B _ T T _ _ S could be solved using BUTTERS, BATTLES, or
BUTTONS), only one of which (e.g., BUTTONS) was presented
during the course of the experiment. Ten easy filler fragments
also appeared in the fragment completion task in order to limit
participants’ awareness of the connection between tasks and to
ensure that they felt successful about their fragment completion
performance.
PROCEDURE
Before the experimental tasks began, participants rated their mood
pleasantness and arousal. A 6-min mood induction procedure fol-
lowed, during which participants viewed the IAPS pictures and
listened to the corresponding sound clip using headphones. Each
picture appeared on the computer screen for 5 s. Participants were
instructed to relax and think about how the pictures and sounds
made them feel. Participants rated their mood pleasantness and
arousal again after the mood induction in order to determine its
effectiveness.
The 1-back task followed. Participants were instructed to attend
to a series of line drawings presented individually on the com-
puter screen, pressing a key whenever consecutive pictures were
identical, and to ignore the words and non-words that were
superimposed over the pictures. Each overlapping picture and
word/non-word appeared for 1000 ms, with an ISI of 500 ms.
There were 10 pictures that repeated, requiring a key press; these
repeated pictures occurred randomly amid novel pictures, with
lags of two to six pictures in between repeated picture trials. Pic-
ture and word stimuli were assigned randomly to repeated trials,
and no words were repeated during the task. Responses on these
trials were recorded to calculate accuracy and RT. The 55 total trials
proceeded in the following sequence: five pictures presented alone,
eight pictures with superimposed non-words, 34 pictures super-
imposed with either non-words, filler words, or primed words, and
eight pictures with superimposed non-words.
Participants then performed a non-verbal filler task for 10 min.
Following the filler task, participants rated their mood pleasant-
ness and arousal.
During the fragment completion task, participants viewed 30
word fragments, each presented individually on the computer
screen for 3000 ms, with an ISI of 500 ms. They were instructed to
respond out loud with the first word that came to mind, and the
experimenter recorded their responses. The fragments included
10 easy filler fragments, 10 primed items presented as distraction
during the 1-back task, and 10 control items from the list not seen
in the 1-back task.
Following the fragment completion task, participants rated
their mood pleasantness and arousal a final time. Participants
were then given an awareness questionnaire to ensure that the
test was implicit for all participants: they were asked if they had
noticed a connection between any of the experimental tasks, and
if so, to describe the connection. Finally, participants completed
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 399 | 2
Biss et al. Mood and distraction in older adults
a background questionnaire and were debriefed. All participants
watched a brief comedic video clip before leaving as a mood
reinstatement.
RESULTS
Mood pleasantness and arousal ratings made during the experi-
ment are reported in Figure 1. Mood pleasantness ratings were
entered into an ANOVA with mood group (neutral, positive)
as a between-subject factor and rating time (baseline, post-
induction, pre-fragment, post-fragment) as a within-subject fac-
tor. Greenhouse–Geisser corrections for degrees of freedom were
used whenever appropriate. Both the absence of a main effect
for mood, F < 1, and the presence of an effect of rating time,
F(2.3,134)= 48.35, p< 0.001, were qualified by an interaction
between mood group and rating time, F(2.3, 134)= 3.98, p= 0.02,
ηp
2= 0.06. Planned comparisons showed that participants in the
positive mood condition had higher pleasantness ratings follow-
ing the mood induction, t (58)= 2.34, p= 0.02, d = 0.61, but not
at any other point during the experiment, ps> 0.10. Arousal rat-
ings were also entered into a mood group x rating time ANOVA.
Neither of the main effects nor the interaction was significant,
ps> 0.22.
There was no difference in accuracy on the 1-back task for
participants in the neutral (M = 91%, SD= 12%) and posi-
tive affect (M= 90%, SD= 11%) groups, t (58)< 1. Similarly,
there was no difference in 1-back task RTs between the neutral
(M = 599 ms, SD= 128) and positive (M = 619 ms, SD= 111)
groups, t (58)< 1.
Performance on the word fragment completion task is shown
in Table 1. Affect groups did not differ in completion of filler or
control fragments, t s< 1. Priming scores were calculated using
group baseline data, by taking each individual’s primed fragment
completion and subtracting average control fragment completion
for their affect group. Consistent with our prediction, priming for
distraction was greater among older adults in the positive affect
compared to the neutral affect condition, t (58)= 1.99, p= 0.05,
d = 0.51.
To further investigate how mood influenced priming for dis-
traction, we analyzed whether there was an association between
mood ratings and fragment completion performance when base-
line mood was controlled. Across all participants, there was a
significant partial correlation between post-induction pleasant-
ness ratings and priming for distraction, pr= 0.33, p= 0.01. Post-
induction pleasantness ratings were not associated more generally
with fragment completion performance, as indexed by partial cor-
relations with control fragment completion, pr= 0.15, p= 0.25
or with filler fragment completion, pr= 0.20, p= 0.14. Mood
at retrieval was not associated with priming: There was no par-
tial correlation between pleasantness ratings made prior to the
fragment completion task and priming for distraction, pr= 0.18,
p= 0.16.
DISCUSSION
Older adults in an induced positive mood showed greater prim-
ing for distraction compared to age mates in a neutral mood
Table 1 | Mean percentage completion (SD) on the fragment
completion task.
Measure Affect group
Positive Neutral
Filler fragment completion 71 (18) 67 (17)
Primed fragment completion 19.3 (13) 15.7 (10)
Control fragment completion 8.3 (11) 10.7 (9)
Priming 11.0 (13) 5.0 (11)
FIGURE 1 | Ratings made at various points during the experiment for (A) mood pleasantness, and (B) arousal. Error bars indicate standard error of the
mean.
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condition. Although the two mood groups did not differ in 1-
back task performance, they did differ in subsequent knowledge
for distraction presented during that task. In addition, mood pleas-
antness ratings made prior to the 1-back task were associated with
the extent of priming when baseline mood was controlled. Rat-
ings made at other times did not differ between mood groups,
and had no influence on priming for distraction. Thus, the effect
of mood was specific to attention at encoding, and in partic-
ular, there was no evidence that mood at retrieval mattered.
Our results suggest that positive mood in older adults results in
increased encoding of information that was never relevant to a
task.
These findings support the idea that positive affect relaxes
attentional control processes that otherwise restrict goal-irrelevant
information from reaching the focus of attention (Hasher et al.,
1999), an effect that is generally considered an impairing effect of
emotion on attentional selectivity (e.g., Dreisbach and Goschke,
2004; Goeleven et al., 2007; Rowe et al., 2007). Here, we
have shown that reduced inhibitory control and broadening
of attention under positive affect (Fredrickson, 2001) can also
have an enhancing effect. This enhancement was seen here
on an implicit memory task which tested for tacit knowledge
of previous distraction. Given the similarity of these results
to those shown by younger adults (Biss and Hasher, 2011),
positive affect appears to have a similar effect on the down-
stream benefits of distractibility among both younger and older
adults.
Taken together with evidence that aging is associated with
increased positive affect (e.g., Mroczek and Kolarz, 1998; Stone
et al., 2010; Carstensen et al., 2011; Reed and Carstensen, 2012),
our results suggest that age differences in affect may contribute
to at least some age differences in cognition. Older adults gener-
ally have difficulty down-regulating the processing of irrelevant
information, and show greater implicit knowledge about previ-
ous distraction compared to younger adults (Rowe et al., 2006).
Given the evidence here that positive affect modulates older
adults’ processing of distraction, greater positive affect among
older adults may partially contribute to this age difference in
attentional control. There is evidence that positive affect also
influences the magnitude of age differences for other attention
processes: Positive affect mediates the extent of age differences
in alerting efficiency (Noh et al., 2012). Affective state may also
contribute to age differences on the Tower of London task, a
measure of executive function (Phillips et al., 2002). Phillips
and colleagues found that, under induced neutral mood, there
were no age differences in the ability to plan moves on the task.
In contrast, positive mood decreased both younger and older
adults’ planning ability, with older adults particularly disrupted
relative to younger adults. This work highlights the importance
of considering emotional and motivation influences on cogni-
tive performance when studying age differences in cognition
(see also Biss and Hasher, 2011; Hess et al., 2012 for a similar
perspective).
Positive affective shifts associated with age may operate in par-
allel with normative changes in the structure and function of the
brain (see Grady, 2008), potentially amplifying the cognitive con-
sequences of these neural changes. Positive affect is thought to
influence recruitment of prefrontal cortex and cingulate regions
associated with executive control (Mitchell and Phillips, 2007),
possibly via increased dopamine levels in these regions (Ashby
et al., 1999). In particular, positive affect may influence the inter-
action between ventral emotional processing regions involved in
automatic processing of salient information and dorsal control
regions that downregulate processing of goal-irrelevant infor-
mation from the environment (Drevets and Raichle, 1998; Dol-
cos and McCarthy, 2006). There is mounting evidence in favor
of a functional dissociation between the dorsal executive con-
trol network and ventral emotion processing regions (see Dol-
cos et al., 2011). Dolcos and McCarthy (2006) found that poor
working memory performance in the face of emotional distrac-
tion was associated with increased activity in ventral regions
and decreased activity in dorsal regions, suggesting a trade-off
between emotional and executive processes. Given recent fMRI
evidence that younger and older adults recruit ventral affec-
tive areas during viewing of positive stimuli and dorsal execu-
tive control regions during viewing of negative stimuli (Ebner
et al., 2012), it seems possible that positive affect’s impairing
effect on attention is related to decreased blood flow to exec-
utive regions and increased blood flow to affective processing
regions.
Prefrontal control regions have been implicated in age differ-
ences in susceptibility to distraction (e.g., Chao and Knight, 1997;
Jonides et al., 2000; Gazzaley et al., 2008). While performing a
1-back task similar to that used here, older adults showed less acti-
vation in a frontoparietal control network than younger adults
when instructed to ignore irrelevant words, and decreased activity
in this control network was associated with greater priming for the
irrelevant words later on (Campbell et al., 2012). Thus, positive
emotion’s impairing effect on attention selectivity and enhanc-
ing effect on tacit knowledge of past distraction may amplify the
effects of normal aging. Positive affect may act via ventral emotion
processing regions to modulate older adults’ recruitment of pre-
frontal control regions that are already associated with age-related
reductions, thus facilitating automatic or implicit processing of
distraction. Ventral areas of the prefrontal cortex are likely to play
a larger role in this process than are basic emotion areas such as
the amygdala, considering recent event-related potential evidence
suggesting that older adults’ visual attention is not modulated by
the amygdala as is seen in younger adults (Pollock et al., 2012).
In a general sense, both positive affect and aging may result in
a cognitive shift toward a more diffuse mental state that involves
disengagement of executive control and greater reliance on more
automatic processes. While there may be substantial cognitive
costs, such as greater distractibility, there likely are also tangible
benefits to this broadened mode of processing, including enhanced
tacit knowledge of past distraction, as we have shown here.
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